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1. Introduction 
1.1 Problem area 
On the 9
th
 of July 2011 South Sudan (SS) achieved independence from Sudan through 
a historical referendum (Elbagir, 2011). Three decades of civil war had finally been put to 
an end with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005 and along 
the lines of the CPA a referendum on southern secession was conducted (CPA, 2005). 
But not everywhere did they celebrate the independence they for decades had been 
fighting for. 
The oil-rich border area of Abyei did not conduct the referendum despite the fact that 
it in accordance with the CPA should have held a referendum on the same day as the rest 
of southern Sudan to determine whether to follow what was to become SS or to continue 
to be part of Sudan (CPA, 2005). This referendum was seen as the key instrument to end 
two decades of war and a century of instability in Abyei and create long lasting peace 
(CPA, 2005; Johnson, 2011, p. 7; Sheeran, 2011, p. 443). Instead the final solution was 
postponed indefinitely due to disagreement over voter eligibility and border demarcation 
(Salman, 2012, p. 30; Sheeran, 2011, p. 444). Issues, which are always part of 
referendum preparations and therefore might sound solvable, have yet to be solved in 
Abyei. The positions of the four main actors
1
 are entrenched to an extend almost 
unimaginable and with a de facto veto right to all four the question is if an agreement on 
these two issues will ever be found so a referendum can take place. 
The positions of the two states seem further apart than ever. The border demarcation is 
still at an impasse even after the dispute went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague (PCA). On voter eligibility the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) supports 
the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel’s (AUHIP) decision only to let the 
permanent residents from the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms participate in the plebiscite - a 
solution the Government of Republic of the Sudan (GoS) finds unacceptable due to, inter 
alia, its exclusion of the nomadic Misseriya tribes, who enter Abyei in the dry season 
(SAS, 2013, p. 2). 
                                                        
1 Government of South Sudan, Ngok Dinka tribe, Government of the Republic of the Sudan, and the Misseriya tribe 
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These two tribes have a long and terrible history and a paramount mistrust exists 
towards one another (Deng, 1995, p. 292, 297; SAS, 2013, p. 2, 3). The Ngok Dinka and 
GoSS seem willing to compromise but not enough to make the Misseriya and GoS 
accept. It seems that GoS prefers status quo since it is apparently using every change it 
get to prolong the preparation process for the CPA-required referendum (Johnson, 2011, 
p. 4).  
These are just some of the reasons why the final status of Abyei is still undecided. 
Many questions rise but two stand out: What is it that makes this area of 10.500 square 
kilometres so important to the two Sudans, that none of them, apparently, would accept to 
lose it? This question leads to the thought that the use of referendum to create long-term 
peace and societal reconciliation in Abyei might not be the right approach. This leads to 
the following research question. 
1.2 Research question 
How will the use of referendum in Abyei as the primary conflict resolution tool influence 
the creation of long-term peace and societal reconciliation? 
 
 
 
(Sidorov, 2011) 
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Theoretical foundation 
In analysing how the use of referendum in Abyei as the primary conflict resolution 
tool will influence the creation of long-term peace and societal reconciliation, it is crucial 
to understand referendum as a legal and political instrument. The methodology will 
therefore take point of departure in a literature review of peer-reviewed journal articles 
on referendum and self-determination conflicts. To create a thorough understanding both 
theoretical and case-based articles will be included. This will create a foundation for 
understanding what the theoretical idea behind the use of referendum is and how it has 
actually turned out in reality. 
After referendum as a legal and political instrument is understood and put into a 
relevant theoretical and practical context it is possible to identify key dynamics, which 
influence the conduct of referendum. The literature review and the thereof distilled key 
dynamics will constitute the theoretical foundation of the analysis. 
2.2 Analysis- and discussion design 
This is an empirical and qualitative report, which for the design means that the case 
and not the key dynamics will structure the analysis. If the dynamics were structuring the 
analysis there would be a considerable risk of leaving out endemic Abyei dynamics. The 
key dynamics identified in the literature review will be applied when it makes analytical 
sense. The analysis will begin with a critical and methodical assessment of the root-
causes of the conflict and the current development followed by a conflict analysis of the 
complex roles of the four parties and their interest in Abyei. 
These findings will be applied in a discussion of the shortcomings of referendum as a 
conflict resolution tool in general and in Abyei in particular but also the risk of violence 
if Abyei does not conduct a referendum. 
2.3 Empirical data 
The empirical foundation of this paper is a mixture of journal articles from SS experts 
like Douglas H. Johnson and publications from highly relevant and reliable sources such 
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as the Rift Valley Institute, Institute for Security Studies, Small Arms Survey, and the 
International Crises Group. 
As goes the complementary empirical data the researcher’s employment at the Danish 
embassy has been utilised. This paper draws on unpublicised documents, country 
programmes, intelligence reports, working documents, and minutes from various 
meetings. 
2.4 Validity and reliability 
The researcher has not been on any field visits to Abyei, which of course must be seen 
as a weakness. In spite of that, the reliability of the information used must be deemed as 
high. The research is founded on peer-reviewed journal articles and research from highly 
respectable sources. To that, official donor documents, intelligence and reports from the 
ground, official documents from UN and AU are also applied. This combination ensures 
the reliability of the analysis and discussion. 
As mentioned in appendix 1, Denmark has for many years been engaged in southern 
Sudan and did among other things help with the organisation of the southern Sudan 
referendum. The risk of a positive SS bias is definitely an actual concern but by including 
documents from various sources the potential pro-SS bias is mitigated to an acceptable 
level. 
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3. Theoretical perspectives 
3.1 Referendum as conflict resolution tool 
Referendum is as such not a theoretical concept but a legal and political instrument to 
gain legitimacy, nationally as well as internationally, for various kinds of policy 
proposals. When put into the context of self-determination claims the meaning changes. 
Referendum is still a popular vote but not primarily to give legitimacy to policies of 
political parties but rather to decide on independence, affiliation or autonomy. 
Carl Schmitt defined referendum as: “(…) a popular vote on the confirmation or 
nonconfirmation of a decision of the legislative body” (2008, p. 287). In line with this 
definition a parliamentary election is not to be considered a referendum because the 
voters have to choose a specific party or candidate, which does not qualify as a 
‘confirmation or nonconfirmation’ decision. Carl Schmitt’s understanding of referendum 
is in line with the UN terminology. Here referendum is often used with the connotative 
meaning of the inhabitants of a geographical area voting for independence or affiliation 
(Weller, 2009, p. 144; UN Chronicle, 1993). Besides the CPA another example in Africa 
is Eritrea cf. the UNGA resolution A/RES/47/114. 
3.2 Literature review 
This sub-chapter will provide a brief overview of leading academic research on self-
determination- and referendum conflicts. The point is two-fold: to place this paper in the 
context of leading current research and through that identify key dynamics, which then 
will be applied in the analysis. It is important to mention that most self-determination- 
cases are qualitatively different from the Abyei case in that sense that they are about 
secession e.g. Kosovo (Dauphinee, 2003, p. 111). Self-determination has in Abyei taken 
the form of the right to decide (through a referendum) on affiliation – not secession. This 
difference is of course reflected in the literature, but parallels are still possible to draw. 
The right to self-determination might be the single most promoted norm in 
international law (Hannum, 1990, p. 27). Self-determination can be defined as: “(…) an 
expression (…) of the aspiration to rule one’s self and not to be ruled by others” 
(Hannum, 1990, p. 27). Self-determination can take many forms (Kirgis, 1994, p. 307) 
and the outcome is not necessarily a referendum. In the case of Kosovo; Kosovo was 
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promised a UN-backed referendum, but when this was removed from the final 
Rambouillet Agreement the parliament unilaterally declared its independence without a 
referendum (Dauphinee, 2003, p. 111; Berg, 2009, p. 228; Dahlman & Williams, 2010, p. 
406). This lead to recognition by the US and most European states but Russia and Serbia 
deemed the proclamation illegal (Dahlman & Williams, 2010, p. 406). Kosovo represents 
a different case of self-determination than Abyei and the solution through self-proclaimed 
independence has not solved the issue with Serbian enclaves in the north and territoriality 
continues to be a contested issue in Kosovo.  
This link between self-determination and territoriality is though not unique to Kosovo 
and Margaret Moore outlines how the existence of this link in current political practices 
is problematic due to its inability to: “(…) generate rules and mechanisms (…) for 
resolving national conflict” (1997, p. 900). Eiki Berg confirms this territorial dilemma 
and points to the conflict between the two central principles of international law: the right 
to self-determination and territorial integrity - a dilemma seen in situations where two or 
more parties are claiming the same territory (2009, p. 220, 224). Peter G. Veit confirms 
that overlapping land rights and therefore different perception of territoriality is a 
growing source of rural strife in Africa (2013, p. 2). 
The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples from 1960 makes a clear link between the: “(…) sovereign right of all people 
(…)” and “(…) their territorial integrity” (Hannum, 1990, p. 34). Territorial integrity is a 
complex concept and the complexity only increases when put in context with nomadic 
activity, as is the case in many African self-determination conflicts. In cases where self-
determination is pursued on behalf of permanent residents in territories also used by 
nomads, the self-determination claim in itself, when understood as territorial, will 
threaten the very way of life of the nomads and therefore also their right to self-
determination (Moore, 1997, p. 910). How is the sovereign right of people respected 
when nomads are violating their territorial integrity? And from the other perspective: how 
is the nomads’ traditional right to land respected, when their notion of territoriality is 
opposing the one of permanent residents? This problem is also touched upon by Fredrik 
Barth (2000, p. 22, 29) when he through his analysis of the concept of boundaries 
explains how the cognitive understanding of boundaries within nomadic tribes is not 
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linked to territory, which therefore further underlines the inadequacy of the: “(…) 
territorial conception of self-determination (…)” (Moore, 1997, p. 900). 
This dilemma of territoriality and nomadic activity constitutes one of the key 
dynamics when trying to understand the complexity of self-determination and referendum 
disputes. 
The criteria for voter eligibility need to be agreed upon before any election or 
referendum can be conducted. As many researchers have identified this can in an African 
context be difficult to determine and the case of Somaliland is no exception (Kaplan, 
2008, p. 150; Harvard Law, 2006, p. 2234; Hersi & Mohamed, 2010, p. 24; Sheeran, 
2011, p. 444).  
The self-declared Republic of Somaliland did in 2001 conduct a referendum on 
independence (Hersi & Mohamed, 2010, p. xiv). Somaliland has since early 1990ties 
been a de facto independent state within Somalia (Spears, 2003, p. 89) so the outcome of 
the referendum was no surprise. The most common criteria are age, residency, and/ or 
citizenship (Harvard Law, 2006, p. 2241). In Somaliland voter eligibility was determined 
according to citizenship, which was defined by paternal lineage (Polhill & Water, 2001), 
but as in many other African countries birth certificates can be difficult to validate and 
reliable estimations of eligible voters are difficult to obtain (Hersi & Mohamed, 2010, p. 
101, 24; Kaplan, 2008, p. 150).  
This dynamic of citizenship and voter eligibility is always relevant in referendum 
conflicts and its relevance only increases when combined with the first dynamic of 
territoriality and nomadic activity. 
3.2.1 Identification of key dynamics 
In continuation of the literature review it is now possible to pinpoint two key 
dynamics. A comprehensive list of dynamics relevant for every self-determination 
situation is not possible to include in a paper of this scope. The two dynamics identified 
are slightly overlapping and in reality difficult to separate. 
 
 Territoriality and nomadic activity: The notion of exclusive right to a specific 
territory and the seasonal presence of nomads will potentially serve as a conflict 
catalyst. Nomadic pastoralists will furthermore use resources: grazing areas, water 
When referendum is not the answer – the case of Abyei February 2014 
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reserves etc., which only adds to the potential conflict. This dynamic is central in 
analysing and understanding the relationship between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya.  
 
 Citizenship and voter eligibility: This dynamic is important not only to 
understand the relationship between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya, but also the 
relationship and power politics between GoS and GoSS. In the case of Abyei 
voter eligibility has served as one of the main bones of contention and the fact 
that it is difficult to obtain reliable estimations of eligible voters only emphasises 
the relevance of this dynamic when trying to understand the Misseriya’s attempts 
to become eligible. 
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4. The Conflict in Abyei 
4.1 Understanding Abyei  
Abyei is an area of 10.500 square kilometres and is located at the poor defined border 
between Sudan and SS (Lund, 2012; Zapata, 2013). Abyei is inhabited with 
approximately 100.000 people (WHO, 2013, 1), but this number varies due to IDPs and 
seasonal migration. These inhabitants can be divided in two overall ethnic groups: one 
being the permanent residents from the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms and the other being 
the Arab nomads from the Misseriya tribe who migrate to Abyei during the dry season to 
find grazing land for their cattle (SAS, 2013, p. 2). Abyei consists of rich pastureland and 
depending on the border demarcation (see map below)  
Source: Craze, 2011, p. 17 
 
the oil fields of Diffra
2
, Heglig, Garaad, Toma, Taiyib, Bamboo West, and Bamboo 
(MacDonald, 2011, para. 5; Craze, 2011, p. 14, 17). 
To understand the conflict in Abyei it is necessary to scrutinise the historical 
relationship between the regime in the Khartoum and the people of the South and the 
                                                        
2 Is sometimes called Defra 
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relationship between each state and their tribal allies, respectively. It is also necessary to 
include the complicated relationship between Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. Due to the 
scope this paper it is not possible to go in-depth with the pre-first civil war period but key 
issues will be outlined below. 
Under Turkish rule (1820-55) the Humr branch of the Misseriya tribe raided Abyei on 
a regular basis to capture people from the Ngok Dinka tribe in order to sell them as slaves 
in the north (Craze, 2011, p. 9). This period constitute the beginning of a deep-rooted 
mistrust between the two tribes (SAS, 2013, p. 2).  
100 years after the end of Turkish rule the first civil war broke out in 1955 (Craze, 
2011, p. 10). The Misseriya were in great number recruited into government-backed 
militias and in response many Ngok Dinka joined the greater Dinka tribe in the Anyanya 
rebel movement said to be the predecessor of SPLM (Craze, 2011, p. 10). During the first 
civil war especially one episode is still central in the Ngok Dinka self-understanding. In 
1965 in the town of Babanusa 72 civilians from Ngok Dinka were burned alive by a 
Misseriya militia (Deng, 1995, p. 292, 297). This incident is today still grieved in Ngok 
Dinka communities and serves as a reason for continued struggle. 
The Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972 brought the first civil war to an end. The 
Agreement guaranteed border areas, which were geographically and culturally southern 
the right to conduct referendum on whether or not to join the newly established Southern 
Region (Craze, 2011, p. 11). Abyei was also promised this opportunity (Zapata, 2013) to 
great fear within the Misseriya who foresaw that if Abyei joined the Southern Region it 
would lead to a permanent loss of access to the essential Abyei grazing routes (Craze, 
2011, p. 11). All in all the Addis Ababa Agreement increased the feeling of 
marginalisation within the Misseriya tribe (Craze, 2011, p. 11) and the necessity of taking 
matters into their own hands and not relying on Khartoum became more and more 
obvious.  
This led in 1977 the Misseriya to form the Murahaliin militias and attack Abyei before 
the second civil war officially broke out (Craze, 2011, p. 11). These attacks were 
different from previous raids because they directly targeted settlements and civilians and 
because the overall goal was not, as previously, to steal cattle but to ensure access to 
Abyei and ultimately make Abyei exclusively an area for the Misseriya (Craze, 2011, p. 
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11). In 1983 the second civil war broke out and one of the main reasons was that 
Khartoum deliberately worked against the preparation process of the promised 
referendum (Zapata, 2013).  
After the outbreak of the second civil war the Misseriya attacks on Ngok Dinka 
intensified (Craze, 2011, p. 12). The attacks followed the same genocidal structure as 
previously but were now directly funded by the regime in Khartoum (Craze, 2011, p. 12). 
This gave Khartoum leverage to some degree of control over the militias, which meant 
that the militias were used to, inter alia, eliminate the Ngok Dinka who interfered with 
the oil exploitation. In 1989 in a successful attempt to create an even stronger control 
over the Misseriya militias Omar al-Bashir, the leader of the NCP and the new president 
of Sudan, made the Murahaliin into a formal military entity called the Popular Defence 
Forces (Craze, 2011, p. 12). With this new control the attacks intensified during the 
1990ties with coordinated attacks on Ngok Dinka cattle and settlements to permanently 
push out Ngok Dinka from Abyei (Craze, 2011, p. 12).  
Within the Ngok Dinka communities the feeling of alienation and anger increased 
because the promised referendum did not materialise. This feeling of marginalisation 
combined with the on-going Misseriya raids resulted in the formation of Anyanya II rebel 
movement (Craze, 2011, p. 12). When the CPA was finally signed in 2005 and Abyei 
once again promised its right to self-determination through referendum (CPA, 2005, p. 
66) the scepticism and distrust were paramount. The deliberate use of demographic 
warfare by Khartoum combined with the genocidal raids by the Misseriya is not forgotten 
and is today still affecting the process of resettlement (Craze, 2011, p. 12; Johnson, 2010, 
p. 36). 
4.2 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Current Deadlock  
This sub-chapter will take point of departure in the CPA and the time up until time of 
writing. The purpose is two-fold: first, to show the political complexity of post-CPA 
Abyei– what happened and why; second, to scrutinise the different positions and the 
various proposals and compromises and through that show the various deferring tactics 
used by NCP to prolonged the process of finding a final solution. 
When referendum is not the answer – the case of Abyei February 2014 
 14 
The CPA was signed January 2005 and was meant to cover the period from 2005 to 
2011 until the referendum for southern secession could be conducted (Johnson, 2008, p. 
2; SAS, 2013, p. 2). 
Already then it was obvious that the final solution to Abyei would have to be given 
extra attention and solved separately from the Southern Sudan referendum. Abyei was 
deemed too intractable and delicate to be dealt with together with the rest of southern 
Sudan and the main reason why SPLM accepted this exclusion was that they did not want 
to give NCP any possibility to hinder the overall goal of southern secession. By that 
SPLM accepted that Abyei had to be dealt with in a post-secession reality and therefore 
to some extend outside of the CPA legal framework (Johnson, 2010, p. 30; Craze, 2011, 
p. 27). Concretely, this resulted in a special ‘Abyei Protocol’ to the CPA that granted 
Abyei status of a transitional area
3
 (HRW, 2008, p. 11). This guarantied Abyei the right 
to conduct a separate referendum simultaneously with the rest of southern Sudan, but just 
as SPLM feared this never materialised and at the time of writing the status of Abyei still 
is undecided. 
4.2.1 The border dispute 
The northern border of Abyei has been and still is one of the absolute central issues in 
the conflict (Ahmed, 2009, p. 140). Both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya claim the sole right 
to the territory and use various and different argument to support their claims – some 
more valid than others (Craze, 2011, p. 14; Johnson, 2008, p. 11; Johnson, 2011, p. 6). 
The border dispute goes back more than a century. Abyei was by the British colonial 
power considered the land of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms and was in 1905 
administratively transferred from Bahr al-Ghazal in the south to neighbouring Kordofan 
State in the north (Ahmed, 2009, p. 140). The Ngok Dinka had prior to the transfer 
complained over raids committed by the Humr Misseriya and as a solution the Ngok 
Dinka was transferred to the same region as the Misseriya with the notion that the two 
tribes then had to find a solution on how to coexist (Johnson, 2010, p. 33). 
                                                        
3 Two other border areas, Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile State, were given the same status 
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Under the Abyei Protocol the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) was established 
to define Abyei’s geographical borders4 and had to do this with the 1905 demarcation as 
the answer book (HRW, 2008, p. 11; Craze, 2011, p. 13).  
The ABC’s demarcation had to be finished before a referendum could be conducted 
and according to the ABC’s mandate its decision was final and binding (Johnson, 2011, 
p. 3). The ABC found that the border should run through the desert area of Goz, which 
divides the two ethnic groups making Goz an area of shared rights (Craze, 2011, p. 14). 
Both NCP and Misseriya immediately rejected this decision. From the perspective of 
NCP it most likely had to do with the ABC’s inclusion of the strategic oil fields of Heglig 
and Diffra in the Abyei area (Craze, 2011, p. 14) and furthermore, because a rejection 
would prolong the, for NCP, economically lucrative status quo (Craze, 2011, p. 27). This 
rejection increased tension in Abyei and in June 2008 Sudan’s Armed Forces (SAF) 
together with Misseriya militias invaded Abyei (Craze, 2011, p. 15, 38: SAS, 2011, p. 1). 
Through clashes with SPLA many households were destroyed and 60.000 Ngok Dinka 
fled the area (SAS, 2013, p. 2).  
Following this violent outbreak an Abyei Roadmap was drafted to address the crisis 
(Craze, 2011, p. 15). The Roadmap did address the security issues of Abyei but refrained 
from addressing issues central to Ngok Dinka, which was included in the Abyei Protocol 
(Craze, 2011, p. 15). For example, the Roadmap stated that the presidency (NCP) should 
appoint the Abyei Administration, which according to the Protocol should have been 
done through an election (Craze, 2011, p. 15). The appointment of an administration has 
been one of the unconditional requirements from NCP and following the Roadmap it 
would now be exclusively up to NCP to appoint it. This gave NCP a tool to prolong the 
process.  
On the border demarcation dispute the Roadmap referred the case to the PCA. With 
Ngok Dinka feeling they had no other option than to accept yet another compromise they 
and SPLM agreed to take the dispute to The Hague. The PCA ruling reduced Abyei to 
only constitute the area of permanent settlements of the Ngok Dinka and therefore, 
contrary to the ABC’s demarcation, Abyei did no longer encompass the oil fields of the 
                                                        
4 The rest of the North-South border was to be demarcated by the North-South Border Technical Committee 
(Johnson, 2010, p. 30) 
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northeast (Johnson, 2011, p. 3). Ngok Dinka accepted this loss of territory and SPLM the 
loss of oil fields, but the Misseriya rejected the ruling due to claims of not being properly 
included in the consultations and due to the fact that this demarcation, which solemnly 
focused on Ngok Dinka settlements, would exclude the Misseriya from participating in 
the upcoming referendum (Craze, 2011, p. 16). Both claims are valid. First, the CPA 
negotiations and the ABC consultations were to a large extend excluding the Misseriya 
through the argument that they were represented through NCP (Craze, 2011, p. 16). 
Second, if Misseriya was excluded from the referendum Abyei would most likely become 
part of SS, which the Misseriya feared would lead to a permanent loss of access (Craze, 
2011, p. 11).  
4.2.2 The current stalemate 
According to the Abyei Protocol the Government of National Unity
5
, should appoint a 
local interim administration to govern Abyei until the 2011 referendum (Craze, 2011, p. 
16; CPA, pp. 65, 66; UNMISS, 2009). For NCP, as mentioned, the formation of a local 
administration was seen as a prerequisite to the conduct of referendum (Sudantribune, 
2013, 1). Furthermore, NCP also demanded that the border demarcation process had to be 
finalised and accepted by all parties prior to the referendum (Johnson, 2010, p. 18).  
These requirements have several times provided NCP with effective instruments to 
delay the process. To give some examples: when ABC presented its conclusions on July 
14, 2007 NCP promptly rejected it though they had already accepted the ABC’s findings 
to be final and binding (HRW, 2008, p. 12; Johnson, 2011, p. 3). Furthermore, when 
SPLM accepted the compromise of taking the demarcation issue to the PCA, which 
resulted in the diminution of the territory of Abyei and the exclusion of oil fields, NCP 
still encouraged Misseriya to resettle in the new and smaller Abyei. Permanent residency 
and/ or ethnic belonging to indigenous communities were the two criteria for eligibility in 
the Southern Sudan referendum (Curless, 2011, p. 3), and since Misseriya would not be 
able to argue that they are an indigenous community of the south, they would be able to 
resettle and become permanent residents, and through that become eligible to vote in 
Abyei (Johnson, 2010, p. 39) – the dynamic of Citizenship and Voter Eligibility is here 
evident.  
                                                        
5 Headed by Omar al-Bashir with Salva Kiir as first vice president (ICG, 2011, p. 33) 
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This NCP-manoeuvre was done well aware of the fact that it directly opposed the 
intention of the PCA. According to the CPA the Misseriya would independently of the 
referendum result: “(…) retain their traditional rights to graze cattle and move across 
(…) Abyei” (CPA, 2005, p. 65). This was confirmed in the PCA ruling (PCA, 2009, p. 
260), which should leave no doubt as to whether the traditional rights of the Misseriya to 
Abyei would still be valid and respected even after an eventual incorporation of Abyei 
into SS. As mentioned above, the PCA ruling purposely focused on defining Abyei as the 
permanent settlements of Ngok Dinka and therefore automatically excluding Misseriya 
from the referendum. This was intended to empower Ngok Dinka with the right to self-
determination (Johnson, 2010, p. 39) but at the same time still guaranteeing the continued 
seasonal access to Abyei for the Misseriya.  
Questions arise; why did Misseriya reject the PCA proposal and willingly took part in 
the resettling of Abyei? The answer is straightforward. NCP misinformed Misseriya 
about the content of the PCA-ruling letting them believe that their traditional rights 
would be nullified (Craze, 2011, p. 15). The Misseriya deem access to Abyei essential to 
their way of life, and with the new information from NCP on the implications of the 
PCA-ruling a Misseriya congress announced that any attempt to implement the PCA 
demarcation would result in violence (Craze, 2011, p. 16). Once again NCP deliberately 
prolonged status quo this time by using the Misseriya tribe as their procrastination-tool. 
NCP was and still is benefitting from status quo, inter alia, oil exploitation, and this was 
just another way to prolong it (Craze, 2011, p. 15, 27; Johnson, 2011, p. 4; Johnson, 
2008, p.9). It is important to mention here that Misseriya previously had experienced 
clashed with SPLA when entering Abyei so their mistrust is not only due to NCP’s 
misinformation campaigns (SAS, 2013, p. 3).  
This gives some explanation to the recurring violent breakouts. In February and March 
2011 Abyei experienced the worst outbreak since the 2008 invasion (Craze, 2011, p. 19). 
This time Misseriya militias attacked the police force in Abyei. NCP claim no 
responsibility but sources say that the militias were armed with SAF weapons and some 
reports even say that several soldiers were wearing SAF uniforms (Craze, 2011, p. 37). 
The reasons behind this continued use of violence by the Misseriya and probably also the 
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SAF adds to the suspicion that NCP through depopulation tactics is trying to improve 
facts on the ground and achieving a better bargaining position (Craze, 2011, p. 37).  
4.3 Ngok Dinka and Misseriya 
4.3.1 Misseriya 
Most of Abyei has through generations been used both by Misseriya and Ngok Dinka. 
Traditionally, Ngok Dinka has enjoyed primary rights and Misseriya secondary- or 
seasonal rights (Johnson, 2010, p. 24), so when the ruling of the PCA included the 
concept of shared secondary rights over the proposed border area Goz and guarantied the 
Misseriya seasonal gazing rights in Abyei (PCA, 2009) it looked like customary law and 
traditions were simply put into writing. This is not the case and this sub-chapter will shed 
light on why. 
The Misseriya tribe is nomadic pastoralists and lives most of the year in South 
Kordofan (Craze, 2011, p. 23; Salman, 2012, p. 22). In the dry season (November to 
May) the Misseriya tribe has to migrate in order to find sufficient grazing opportunities 
for their cattle (SAS, 2013, p. 2). This way of life has during the last decades gradually 
been put under more and more pressure from different and unexpected sides. 
Since oil was discovered in the 1970ties GoS laid claim to large areas, which had 
previously been accessible for the Misseriya and their herds. In the same period, GoS 
engaged in large-scale farming schemes some of which were also located in areas 
previously part of Misseriya grazing routes (Johnson, 2010, p. 26). But this only 
represents the pressure from the side of their ally in Khartoum. From a more geological 
perspective desertification and unstable rainfall patterns have further increased the 
scarcity of essential grazing land (Johnson, 2010, p. 26). If these were the only sources of 
pressure it would seem rather irrational of the Misseriya to so indisputable reject peace 
solutions where their seasonal access to Abyei is guaranteed. If we look aside from the 
misinformation by NCP mentioned above, another reason for these straightforward 
rejections of the conduct of referendum might lie in the historical rivalry and a deep-
rooted mistrust between them and the Ngok Dinka. In a scenario where Abyei would 
become part of SS the Misseriya would have to rely on Ngok Dinka to open the gates to 
Abyei, which simply compose too great a risk. This mistrust is supported by recent years 
denial of access to traditional grazing areas in the SS states of Unity and Northern Bahr 
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al-Ghazal (Johnson, 2010, p. 40). If Abyei joins SS it is logical that the Misseriya would 
expect the same trouble getting access to Abyei as they are currently experiencing in 
relation to the rest of northern SS. The first dynamic identified touches upon exactly this: 
the territorial claim of the Misseriya to Abyei due to traditional grazing rights will be in 
direct conflict with the territorial integrity of the Ngok Dinka and if Abyei joins SS also 
with SS as a recognised state with inviolable borders.  
4.3.2 Ngok Dinka 
Unlike the positions of the Misseriya and GoS the positions of the Ngok Dinka and 
GoSS are difficult to separate. This means that the analysis of Ngok Dinka partly will be 
in this sub-chapter and partly in the GoSS sub-chapter.  
The Ngok Dinka tribe is part of the wider Dinka tribe (of which current GoSS 
president Salva Kiir belongs (Doki & Muhumuza, 2013)) and has been permanent 
resident in Abyei since the 18
th
 century (Johnson, 2010, p. 31; Graze, 2011, p. 6). The 
Ngok Dinka has agreed to “(…) a compromise of a compromise (the PCA ruling) of a 
compromise (the ABC report) (…)” and the frustration over the lack of the same 
willingness from the NCP and Misseriya has created the feeling of despair (Craze, 2011, 
p. 18, 19; Johnson, 2011, p. 5) and the willingness of accepting compromises might have 
reached its limit. This frustration became evident when the Ngok Dinka angrily declined 
to even consider a new proposal put forward by the AUHIP where Abyei would undergo 
further division meaning the last oil field, Diffra, would now be north of the border 
(Craze, 2011, p. 20). This was simple to take it too far and both Ngok Dinka and the 
GoSS rejected it. NCP probably knew that this would happen and once again the Abyei 
solution was postponed, status quo prevailed, and the oil exploitation continued.  
4.4 The importance of Abyei to the Government of South Sudan 
For GoSS there are mainly three reasons why Abyei at some point must become part 
of SS. The first one is economic and is connected to the oil in Abyei. SS’s economy is 
driven solemnly by foreign aid and oil revenue (ICG, 2011, p. ii; BBC, 2013) and the 
potential of getting exclusive access to the Abyei oil fields would have a stabilising effect 
on this one-tracked economy. The negation of this is that if Abyei stays as part of Sudan 
the state budget of SS will suffer and a potential dangerous situation could erupt.  
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The second reason is that during both the first- and second civil war the Ngok Dinka 
in Abyei fought on the same side as the rest of contemporary SS and suffered equally if 
not more than other areas of the South (Craze, 2011, p. 12). The fact that Abyei is still 
part of Sudan is a continued source of anger within the wider Dinka community– an 
anger that will not disappear. 
But this is not the main reason why Abyei in the eyes of the GoSS must join SS. Many 
Ngok Dinka are still today represented in the inner circles of SPLM, the ruling party in 
SS. This means that Abyei represents more than just the oil revenue and the guilt of 
comrades still living in occupied territory. Abyei has a huge symbolic value and is a 
personal matter to many of the high-ranking government- and military officials (Craze, 
2011, p. 12), which together with the abovementioned reasons make it difficult to 
imagine SS ever accepting a solution where Abyei stays as part of Sudan. It is in that 
connection not unthinkable that a potential permanent loss of Abyei might result in 
internal instability, which makes Abyei a central tool in SS’s security politics (Al Jazeera 
1, 2013, p. 4).  
4.5 The importance of Abyei to the Government of Sudan 
During the CPA negotiations NCP was determined to exclude Abyei from the 
Southern Sudan referendum. The result of the referendum was beforehand given, which 
made the exclusion of Abyei crucial. For the NCP the permanent loss of Abyei would 
potentially have devastating consequences.  
As mentioned, the oil fields in Abyei are currently under the control of SAF (Craze, 
2011, p. 62). The Sudanese economy is almost exclusively relying on oil revenue and a 
potential loss of the Abyei share would increase the pressure on an already unstable 
economy (Ahmed, 2009, p. 140; BBC, 2013). As was seen in the September/ October 
2013 uprising in the bigger cities including Khartoum (Malik, 2013; Al Jazeera 2, 2013), 
oil- and gas prices are extremely sensitive and the gas prices will logically become even 
more difficult to control if the overall oil extraction decreases. This clearly outlines the 
link between continued access to Abyei oil and regime security.  
Regime security is also the central theme when it comes to the historical alliance with 
the Misseriya tribe. The Misseriya has historically been an allied of the regime in 
Khartoum (Craze, 2011, p. 12), which is a situation NCP would do almost anything to 
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preserve (Craze, 2011, p. 13, 21). Recently, Omar al-Bashir guarantied his personal 
engagement in the Misseriya’s fight for acknowledgement of its right to Abyei and has 
underlined that under no circumstances will he give up on Abyei (BBC, 2013). From a 
regime security point of view this is probably a clever decision and announcement. A 
situation where Abyei would join SS and Misseriya would lose access to Abyei would 
most likely result in a breakdown of their alliance. A break like that could potentially turn 
the entire Misseriya tribe into enemies of NCP resulting in a potential darfurisation of 
South Kordofan and surrounding states. It is of course not possible to foretell what 
implications this would have for the regime, but an insurgency from the Misseriya 
combined with the on-going conflict in Darfur, the frozen but not resolved conflict in the 
East cf. Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement from 2006 (2013, ICG, 2013, p. i), SPLM-N 
rebellion in Blue Nile and Nuba Mountain and the simmering and growing dissatisfaction 
in the bigger cities have the potential of resulting in a country-wide civil war 
(Sudantribune, 2013, 2; Malik, 2013).  
The Misseriya tribe is not the only armed group the NCP has been funding and 
arming. To lose Abyei and to lose the Misseriya together with the above-mentioned 
conflicts, might tip the balance of NCP’s ability to control its proxy militias and the total 
collapse of the regime would in this scenario not be an unthinkable outcome.  
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5. Referendum - the solution for Abyei? 
5.1 Too colourful for a monochrome resolution  
The conflict in Abyei is unfolding at both national- and local levels. At the national 
level the conflict has been going on for so long that to pursue a win-loss resolution seems 
inadequate. There is too much at stake and too much prestige involved for any of the two 
states to accept a permanent loss. If a resolution should ever satisfy both states it would 
have to establish the possibility of both Sudan and SS to present the outcome as being an 
advantage for their country, respectively. Even though this is the simple logic of political 
compromises a scenario where this will actually be the case seems far away. 
Furthermore, the very path the international society has taken to achieve this 
compromise has been through the demarcation of fixed borders, which in a nomadic area 
like Abyei screams of lack of context understanding. It seems that the Westphalian 
perception of nation-states has been deemed applicable in a non-Westphalian 
environment. By pursuing referendum as the main resolution tool to decades of conflict 
in and over Abyei the international society reveals a bias towards traditional nation-state 
building, where the accuracy of border demarcation is of outermost importance and goes 
before other aspects of state building. This analysis clearly shows that Western ideas of 
territoriality and border demarcation are fundamentally different from those existing 
within the nomadic Misseriya community. 
At the local level the probability of the conduct of a multilateral referendum does not 
seem any stronger. The Misseriya will not accept a referendum excluding them from 
voting and Ngok Dinka will not accept a referendum where Misseriya is deemed eligible. 
Misseriya fears permanent loss of seasonal access and Ngok Dinka fear that if the 
Misseriya is deemed eligible NCP will flood Abyei prior to a referendum with people 
from branches of the Misseriya tribe who are not even seasonal user of Abyei (Craze, 
2011, p. 26) in order to tip the balance and win the referendum. This shows that the very 
decision on voter eligibility more or less will determine the outcome of the referendum. 
This is the main reason why the legal status of Abyei is not the most important issue to 
address at the local level if long-term peace and societal reconciliation is the goal. Instead 
the deep-rooted mistrust and hatred should be given the highest priority. Before this 
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relationship is improved no solution at state level will satisfy both tribes and as long as 
the mistrust between the tribes are at the current level it is too easy for GoS to manipulate 
the Misseriya and use them in their own power play. This mistrust, fear, and hatred need 
to be acknowledged and dealt with in a substantive way. The necessary solution includes 
measures far more time-consuming and demanding, economically as well as technically, 
than the conduct of a referendum. The scope of this paper is not to outline an exact 
roadmap of societal reconciliation, but it is clear from the analysis that tools like truth 
commissions as seen in post-apartheid South Africa, trials as seen in post-genocide 
Rwanda, and an effort to create a new understanding among both tribes of what unify 
them instead of what segregate them are all tools, which to some extend need to be 
included in the Abyei resolution (Cobban, 2007, p. 47; Waldorf, 2009, p. 16, 19; 
Lanegran, 2005, p. 116). Measures need to be taken to create an awareness of a shared 
history of Ngok Dinka and Misseriya – an active use of memory politics and transitional 
justice tools – if a peaceful co-existence shall ever become reality. As the very last point 
in the Abyei Protocol reconciliation processes are mentioned but in one single sentence 
(CPA, 2005, p. 69). This is inadequate to say the least and reveal the idea of a 
reconciliation process as something, which cannot begin before a final legal status is in 
place, which the analysis clearly shows is untenable in the Abyei case. 
5.2 The risk of violence if a referendum is not conducted 
This entire paper has been about showing the shortcomings of referendum as a 
primary conflict resolution tool in general and in Abyei in particular. As the above 
discussion shows a referendum produces a clear winner and a clear looser and it should 
by now be obvious that none of the four parties can afford loosing. Even though this is 
the main argument of the analysis it is important to note that there exists a risk of 
reigniting the armed struggle if a referendum is not conducted. The Ngok Dinka has been 
promised a referendum twice and they have been patient and willing to compromise – but 
signs indicate that this attitude might be history (Johnson, 2011, p. 4). Ngok Dinka will 
not accept the current situation where Abyei is part of Sudan as a permanent solution. 
Several generations have fought for the right to self-determination and even though 
referendum is an insufficient tool in itself it might very well have to be included in some 
form in an overall strategy to achieve long-term peace and societal reconciliation. 
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6. Conclusion 
6.1 When referendum is not the answer 
To use referendum as the primary conflict resolution tool in Abyei will most likely 
have a negative effect on the creation of long-term peace and societal reconciliation 
because the conduct of a referendum will make either Sudan or SS a clear-cut looser and 
possible also either Misseriya or Ngok Dinka. A referendum outcome, in itself, is too 
black and white, which therefore makes its application in entrenched conflicts difficult. 
As is evident from the analysis Abyei is too important for the two Sudans for any of them 
to allow a permanent loss. This makes it likely that some kind of retaliation in Abyei or 
elsewhere on behalf of the loosing part will prolong the conflict after a referendum. In 
that case the referendum will have been counterproductive to the goal of long-term peace. 
For GoS it is a matter of oil revenue, prestige, and geopolitics which all come down to 
regime security – the potential insurgency resulting from a break of the alliance with the 
Misseriya could have far-reaching consequences for NCP. GoS does not want a 
resolution to Abyei. The currently situation is judged to be more favourable than most 
post-referendum scenarios. GoS has de facto control over the Abyei oil due to Abyei still 
officially being part of Sudan and the Misseriya tribe is put off. 
For GoSS the potential oil revenue also plays an important part but what is more 
important are the ties between Ngok Dinka and SPLM/A. As for NCP Abyei is for the 
SPLM also a matter at national security. Many high-ranking personnel in GoSS and Ngok 
Dinka Chiefs will never accept that Abyei permanently stays as part of Sudan. Their right 
to self-determination have twice been acknowledged and if this will not at some point 
materialise the outbreak of a third civil war does not seem as an unlikely outcome. 
For Misseriya the only thing that matters is the security of their way of life - meaning 
their unobstructed access to grazing land throughout the year. Historically, this has been 
obtained through a combination of violence and the alliance with Khartoum but whether 
or not this will continue depends on the peace process and how they will be included in it. 
What further complicates Abyei is its possible catalytic effect it might have on other 
disputed areas (Johnson, 2008, p. 18) but that is not the only complication. Abyei is a key 
in geopolitics for both GoSS and GoS (Johnson, 2010, p. 15). In more poetic terms Abyei 
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is said to be the heart of Sudan and at the same time representing everything that is wrong 
with it: “(…) an explosive mix of ethnic tension, ambiguous boundaries, oil and age-old 
suspicion and resentment” (MacDonald, 2011, para. 3). Figure out how to create long-
lasting peace in Abyei and the solution to Darfur, the East, South Kordofan, Blue Nile 
might be within reach. 
To conclude, the mixture of nomadic activity, different and opposing perceptions of 
territoriality, overlapping land usage, scarce resources, ambiguous citizenship 
determination, deep-rooted mistrust, historical rivalry at both national and local levels, 
geopolitical significance, regime security, and the counterproductive and ignorant 
interference from the international community considerably complicate the use of 
referendum as the primary conflict resolution tool in Abyei when long-term peace and 
societal reconciliation is the goal. 
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8. Appendix  
Appendix 1 - Danish engagement in South Sudan 
I have during the period of August 2013 to February 2014 been working as a political 
intern at the Royal Danish Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. I have worked in the area 
of peace and security and through that covered the African Union Peace and Security 
Council. Furthermore, I have been assisting the first secretary, Andreas Clausen Boor, in 
controlling and monitoring the Danish engagements in South Sudan, and I have been in 
close contact with the Danish senior advisor in Juba, Karin Marianne Eriksen.  
South Sudan is a priority country for Denmark and the Danish engagement dates back 
prior to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005 (UM, 2013; CDSSS I, 2011; 
CDSSS II, 2012; Appendix 2). Denmark is furthermore one of the lead donors to the New 
Deal Compact, which should have been signed in January 2014 (NewDeal4Peace, 2013).   
The period of my internship was greatly influenced by the unstable situation between 
the two Sudan’s and especial the development in the undefined border region6. In my 
encounter with the Danish engagement in South Sudan many questions have been left 
unanswered. Some directly linked to the Danish priorities and the choices we make and 
have been making at the embassy in Addis Ababa, and some more in connection to the 
broader world society (AU, UN, WB etc.) engagement in a fragile state like South Sudan.  
The overall objective for the Danish engagement in South Sudan is to: “[c]ontribute to 
a united and peaceful South Sudan, building strong foundations for good governance, 
economic prosperity and enhanced quality of life for all” (CDSSS II, 2012, p. ii). One of 
the major challenges on the way to reach this objective is the situation in the disputed 
area of Abyei. A united and peaceful South Sudan is extremely difficult to imagine 
without a final solution to the status of Abyei. This area is inhabited by tribes, which 
consider themselves as South Sudanese but is at the same time used in the dry season by 
nomads, who desperately need grazing areas for their cattle and who consider them selves 
as part of the north. 
                                                        
6 Naturally also the civil war in South Sudan, which erupted in December 2013 cf. Appendix 4 
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A big part of my internship has evolved around this contribution to a: “(…) united and 
peaceful South Sudan” (CDSSS II, 2012) and it is from this perspective the analysis 
originates.  
  
When referendum is not the answer – the case of Abyei February 2014 
 33 
Appendix 2 - Danish bilateral humanitarian aid 2002-2009 
 
 
(Stepputat, Engberg-Pedersen & Fjerskov, 2012, p. 53) 
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Appendix 3 - DANIDA humanitarian assistance in Africa 2012 
 
 
(Danida, Annual Report 2012) 
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Appendix 4 - Political development in South Sudan 
That political situations in Africa are changeable should not come as a surprise and 
should therefore always to some extend be incorporated into any analysis of African 
politics. The recent dramatic developments in South Sudan where a conflict, which most 
of all looks like a civil war with horrifying ethnic undertone (Howden, 2013; Shamdasani 
& Throssell, 2013), is however not reflected in this analysis.  
This is duo to two reasons: one being practical and one being academic. The analysis 
was conducted between ultimo November 2013 and medio December 2013 and was 
therefore produced in a pre-civil war reality and time constraints precluded the possibility 
of taking potential essential changes into account. 
To this paper’s great fortune the current conflict between Dinka and Nuer - between 
Salva Kiir and Riek Machar does in fact not change the relevance or the validity of the 
analysis - but possible scenarios might. It is likely that GoS will use the current instability 
in South Sudan to its own advantage and if the crisis becomes more permanent it is very 
difficult to predict how Bashir will respond. A military respond to secure oil fields and 
the population in the border areas is not unlikely and in a scenario like that the situation - 
politically and humanitarian – will change. 
It is with this in mind the analysis should be understood and should developments 
occur, which will influence the relevance of this paper; it can be discussed during the oral 
examination. 
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